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Risk management has been widely advocated
as a rational means for environmental deci-
sion making, assisting us in dealing with the
wide array of dangers that we face in our
uncertain world, ranging from pathogens in
drinking water to terrorist attacks. Done well,
risk management is inherently precautionary
in the sense that it should make use of effec-
tive risk assessment to predict, anticipate, and
prevent harm, rather than merely reacting
when harm arises. 
Some of the insights that have supported
the movement toward making better use of
available evidence for medical decision mak-
ing, particularly in the field of diagnostic
screening, have important but usually over-
looked insights for environmental decision
making. In particular, the use of four key con-
cepts used for judging the quality of evidence
in medical diagnosis—sensitivity, speciﬁcity,
positive predictive value, and negative predic-
tive value—are relevant to the assessment of
environmental hazards, especially those that
have low probabilities of occurrence. Applying
these concepts rigorously allows us to see more
clearly both the value and the limitations of
the precautionary approach, as well as to
reveal more quantitatively the logical ﬂaw in
the notion of “zero risk.” The key question,
we suggest, is not whether to be precaution-
ary, but how precautionary we ought to be in




Our premise can be illustrated by consider-
ing an analogy with airport security. Suppose
that we have acquired impressive new scan-
ning technology with the following detection
capabilities: a) when someone is carrying a
dangerous weapon, 99.5% of the time it will
respond positively, and b) when someone is
not carrying such a weapon, 98% of the time
it will respond negatively. If our best intelli-
gence indicates that about 1 in 10,000 pas-
sengers screened will be carrying a detectable,
dangerous weapon, we can ask how well the
screening evidence will allow us to manage
this risk. In particular, we can ask, if we get a
positive result how likely is that detection to
be correct? Given the properties described,
common intuition will lead us to expect that
this detection should be reliable.
The answer to our question depends on
considering that, on average, we will need to
screen 9,999 unarmed passengers to ﬁnd the
1 who is carrying a weapon. The characteris-
tics described provide for a false-positive rate
of 2% (98% of the time unarmed passengers
will show up as negative). This means that,
on average, we will get 199.98 or, effectively,
200 false positives detected for every true pos-
itive. Consequently, the answer about how
likely it is that a positive detection will be cor-
rect turns out to be only 0.5% (1 in 201). 
Of course, these numbers are hypotheti-
cal, but they likely overestimate both the
realistic capability of such technology and
the frequency of passengers truly carrying
weapons. The frequency of the hazard we are
seeking to detect is a critical determinant of
the ability of any screening evidence to predict
danger accurately.
The basic rationale for the interpretation of
screening evidence can be presented as a 2 × 2
table in which the rows relate to the evidence
and the columns relate to the reality we seek to
understand, but will never know with absolute
certainty (Gordis 2000). Figure 1 shows that
four quantitative characteristics [sensitivity
(Se), speciﬁcity (Sp), positive predictive value
(PPV), and negative predictive value (NPV)]
are deﬁned by two properties of the screening
method (the false-positive rate, α, and the
false-negative rate, β) and by a property of the
danger being assessed, the frequency of true
hazards, P[H], where H is a true hazard. 
Considering reality (the columns), Se is the
conditional probability, P[EH/H] (where EH
is evidence of a hazard), that the evidence will
identify a true hazard, given a true hazard:
[1]
where TP is true positive and FN is false
negative. 
Sp is the conditional probability,
P[EnH/nH] (where EnH is evidence of a
nonhazard, and nH is a nonhazard), that the
evidence will identify no hazard, given a true
nonhazard: 
[2]
where TN is true negative and FP is false
positive.
Considering the evidence (the rows), PPV
is the conditional probability, P[H/EH], that
something is a true hazard, given that the evi-
dence identiﬁes it as a hazard: 
[3]
NPV (negative predictive value) is the
conditional probability, P[nH/EnH], that
something is truly no hazard, given that the
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Risk management, done well, should be inherently precautionary. Adopting an appropriate degree
of precaution with respect to feared health and environmental hazards is fundamental to risk man-
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tainties, demanding that we understand the equally inevitable false positives and false negatives
from screening evidence. We consider a framework for detection and judgment of evidence of well-
characterized hazards, using the concepts of sensitivity, speciﬁcity, positive predictive value, and
negative predictive value that are well established for medical diagnosis. Our conﬁdence in predict-
ing the likelihood of a true danger inevitably will be poor for rare hazards because of the predomi-
nance of false positives; failing to detect a true danger is less likely because false negatives must be
rarer than the danger itself. Because most controversial environmental hazards arise infrequently,
this truth poses a dilemma for risk management. Key words: complacency, false negatives, false posi-
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Research | CommentarySome of the foregoing terminology, used
widely in various forms in the health and med-
ical sciences, may be confusing to environmen-
tal scientists (chemists, biologists, toxicologists,
and engineers). Environmental scientists are
familiar with sensitivity in a subtly different
sense—as the lowest level of a hazard (e.g., a
pathogen in drinking water) that can be accu-
rately detected. The distinction is that, in
environmental science, sensivity is typically
expressed as a concentration, whereas “sensi-
tivity” as defined in Equation 1 is a condi-
tional probability concerning the ability to
detect a hazard when it is truly present.
Likewise, to an environmental scientist,
“speciﬁcity” refers to the ability of evidence to
discriminate a particular hazard (e.g., a partic-
ular pathogen) from other factors (e.g., other
microbes that may be present). In environ-
mental science, this concept may be used
interchangeably with selectivity. As with sen-
sitivity, the environmental science usage is
subtly different. In environmental science,
“speciﬁcity” is the resolution or selective capa-
bility of the monitoring method, whereas in
medical science “speciﬁcity” is the conditional
probability of declaring no hazard given that
the hazard is truly absent. In this article, we
have retained the terminology adopted by the
health and medical sciences and seek to show
its potential for application to risk manage-
ment in the environmental sciences. 
As Hoffrage et al. (2000) documented, the
intuitive application of the conditional proba-
bilities from Figure 1 is still often misinter-
preted by medical practitioners. In particular,
Se is commonly confused with PPV, which
amounts to inverting inherently unequal con-
ditional probabilities (P[EH/H] ≠ P[H/EH]).
This inequality of conditional probabilities
will be recognized by those familiar with
Bayesian methods, which provide an alterna-
tive approach to deriving these relationships
(Gill 2002). 
P[EH/H] or Se is the probability that a
hazard will be identiﬁed by the evidence, given
that there is truly a hazard. P[H/EH] or PPV is
the probability that a hazard truly exists, given
that one has been identiﬁed by the evidence.
Clearly, it is PPV that should be considered for
interpreting the meaning of evidence, whereas
Se is important, as is Sp, for selecting a screen-
ing method for collecting evidence. The main
factor that creates the asymmetry between
these two conditional probabilities is the fre-
quency of true hazards (P[H]). In fact, these
two conditional probabilities will only be equal
for the special case of P[H] = 0.5 and α = β. 
Serious problems in the use of these con-
ditional probabilities have also been formally
recognized in legal decision making (Balding
and Donnelly 1994). In particular, two ques-
tions may be asked about DNA evidence as
applied to determining guilt of an accused
person: What is the probability that an indi-
vidual will have a DNA match, given that he
or she is innocent? and What is the probabil-
ity that an individual is innocent, given that
there is a DNA match?
As shown above, despite the apparent simi-
larity of these statements, these two conditional
probabilities are not equal because one is the
inverse of the other in terms of which condi-
tion is given. Inverting them by taking the
answer to the ﬁrst question, which the forensic
evidence is able to provide, as being the answer
to the second question, which the court must
decide, has been described as the “prosecutor’s
fallacy.” A murder conviction was overturned
by the British Court of Appeal because forensic
evidence was represented to the jury as if the
ﬁrst conditional probability from the forensic
evidence also directly gave the probability for
answering the second question about inno-
cence (Balding and Donnelly 1994).
A fact recognized in the health and med-
ical sciences is that, regardless of the apparent
capability of a screening method, diminishing
returns will appear when screening is applied
to relatively rare hazards. For example, uni-
versal screening (as opposed to targeting high-
risk groups or individuals) for AIDS (acquired
immunodeﬁciency syndrome) would be futile
in North America because of the preponder-
ance of false positives that would be generated
among the entire population where AIDS is
still relatively rare. 
The current ongoing health care debate
about the value of breast cancer screening
programs for women has acknowledged the
important influence of disease incidence on
the PPV. For example, Meyer et al. (1990)
reported that the PPV for malignant tumors
based on mammography screening was
31.5% (with about two false positives for
every true positive) for women over 50 years
of age, but it was only 8.8% (with about 11
false positives for every true positive) for
women under 50 years of age. This difference
is mainly driven by the much lower incidence
of breast cancer in the younger age group.
This limitation is illustrated in Figure 2,
which shows the PPV as a function of P[H],
for a screening method with an Sp of 99%
(i.e., a low false-positive error rate α = 1%)
and an Se ranging from only 50% (i.e., a high
false-negative error rate, β = 50%) up to 99%
(i.e., a low false-negative rate β = 1%). 
Figure 2 (which is derived from spread-
sheet calculations using Figure 1 with
Equation 3 for PPV and the designated values
for α, β, and P[H]) shows that PPV becomes
increasingly dependent on P[H] for low val-
ues, ultimately becoming linearly related for
true hazard occurrence frequencies < 0.01. 
× 100% as P[H] << α [5]
In practical terms, this shows that the PPV,
our ability to correctly predict danger with a
single source of screening evidence, will
inevitably be poor for rare hazards (i.e., for
small P[H]). Effectively, for PPV to support an
expectation of a positive being more likely cor-
rect than not (PPV > 50%), the false-positive
   
PPV ≈ [] PH
α
Commentary | Hrudey and Leiss
1578 VOLUME 111 | NUMBER 13 | October 2003 • Environmental Health Perspectives













Cases of hazard Cases of
nonhazard
P[H] × n
= [TP + FN]
P[nH] × n
= (1 – P[H]) × n
= [FP + TN]
True positives
(TP)
with rate = Se
False positives
(FP)
with rate = α
False negatives
(FN)
with rate = β
True negatives
(TN)
with rate = Sp
n = [TP + FP









erate, α, must be less than double the likelihood
of the hazard, P[H], a speciﬁcation for a moni-
toring method that is challenging to provide
for very low-frequency hazards. This also
shows that the only characteristic of a screening
method that has any inﬂuence on PPV for low
P[H] is the speciﬁcity (Sp = 1 – α). The prob-
lem is that we become overwhelmed by false
positives in relation to the relatively rare true
positives. An analogy may be made with statis-
tical hypothesis testing, so this can be termed a
type I or false-positive error. 
Clearly, we must expect to have a large
proportion of false positives for any single,
practical screening procedure that we use to
gain evidence for managing risks from impor-
tant and well-characterized but rare hazards.
For the airport security case described above,
we would gladly choose to inconvenience only
200 passengers to catch 1 in 10,000 who is
actually carrying a lethal weapon. However,
we should know what level of precaution we
are applying in any given circumstance so that
we can design appropriate follow-up for the
positives detected, knowing that they will be
mainly false positives. Before resorting to dras-
tic measures, we should apply another test on
this smaller sample of initial positives that will
now have a higher hazard frequency, P´[H] of
1 in 201, providing a 50-fold improvement
from the initial screening, thereby allowing us
to achieve a much lower proportion of false
positives for the second screen.
Roots of Complacency
Perhaps the high degree of precaution that is
inherent to interpreting common monitoring
results can help explain the complacency that
was displayed by the operators and regulators of
the Walkerton, Ontario, Canada, drinking
water system, which contributed to a fatal
waterborne disease outbreak (Hrudey and
Hrudey 2002). In May 2000, 7 individuals
died, the youngest a 30-month-old infant, and
more than 2,000 became ill after drinking
water contaminated with Escherichia coli
O157:H7 and Campylobacter jejuni (O’Connor
2002). A total of 27 people, with a median age
of 4 years, suffered hemolytic uremic syndrome,
a serious kidney condition that may carry life-
long implications. 
The shallow groundwater source had not
been adequately disinfected to cope with
manure contamination from a nearby farm
during a severe rainstorm. Moreover, that sys-
tem had a long history of adverse microbial
monitoring results on treated water, but these
result did not trigger necessary improvements
in disinfection or better source protection.
The evidence of problems included recurring
positive results for the indicator organisms
(total coliforms, fecal coliforms, and E. coli).
Justice Dennis R. O’Connor (2002) con-
cluded that this tragedy should not be blamed
solely on the operators, despite their many
documented failings and misdeeds, since
abundant regulatory failures had allowed
these negative conditions to persist. This case
is important because there is a risk of compla-
cency developing among personnel in other
sectors, from airport security to emergency
response. They will predictably experience a
preponderance of false positives in performing
their routine screening responsibilities dealing
with rare hazards. Complacency may be less
of a concern in environmental circumstances
where there is uncertainty about whether
harm has happened or where feedback about
the lack of harm is not sufﬁciently immediate
to promote complacency. 
Positive results for microbial indicators in
drinking water most likely do not signal the
presence of an infective dose of viable
pathogens making an outbreak imminent,
unless there is other evidence of contamination
(Nwachuku et al. 2002). Rather, positive results
for indicators in treated water signal ineffective-
ness of the disinfection process that must inacti-
vate bacterial pathogens because they will
intermittently challenge the system. Positive
results may reﬂect sampling or analytical errors
as well. There will be many false positives in
which a positive result for indicator organisms
will not coincide with the presence of any viable
pathogens, let alone an infective dose. Hence,
operators will ﬁnd by experience, much more
often than not, that the presence of indicator
organisms has no immediate health conse-
quences to the community if the operators
choose to ignore adverse monitoring results. 
Thus, a predominance of false-positive
results from tests can foster complacency
among the operators. They must understand
the reality that false positives will be the norm
in such types of environmental screening. Of
course, they must also be convinced that effec-
tive responses are still necessary to avoid the
infrequent but devastating disasters. Competent
personnel equipped with the truth will be bet-
ter able to respond effectively than those who
are kept in the dark and told that disaster is
likely to strike with any positive result. 
Complacency is only one of the most
obvious unintended and indirect effects that
may arise from any risk management decision.
Hofstetter et al. (2002) elaborated on the rip-
ple effect metaphor, ﬁrst proposed by Graham
and Wiener (1995), about the many other
effects that arise from an individual risk man-
agement decision. In the water safety example,
ripple effects from actions such as public noti-
fication of adverse water quality results with
no explanation of their meaning, or issuance
of advisories to boil water when pathogens are
unlikely to be present will include undermin-
ing consumer conﬁdence in water safety and
possibly encouraging some to seek alternative,
but less safe, water supplies. 
Exercising Caution and the
Precautionary Principle
The concern expressed by advocates of the
precautionary principle is about the failure to
detect a problem, the chance of allowing a
false negative (a type II error). Figure 3
demonstrates that hazard frequency has a sim-
ilar impact, whereby even a very low sensitiv-
ity (i.e., a high false-negative rate, β = 50%)
still allows an apparently precautionary NPV
(> 99.5%) for those common circumstances
when P[H] is low (< 0.01). An NPV > 99.5%
means that a hazard would truly be present
< 0.5% of the time when the monitoring test
indicated that there was no hazard. The rea-
son for this direct effect is evident when con-
sidering the distribution of values in Figure 1;
a low P[H] corresponds to few occurrences in
the left column. Even a large false-negative
rate, β, will be applied to only a small number
of true hazards, making the failure to detect
any true hazard a rare occurrence among the
total number of cases tested. 
Of course, this will provide small comfort
if extremely severe consequences arise from the
failure to detect a rare true hazard. For exam-
ple, Lewis (1996) estimated that about every
million years we will experience an object
impact from outer space capable of causing a
1-million-megaton explosion that would result
in more than a billion casualties, if not threaten
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●human extinction. We would want to avoid a
false-negative error in predicting such an event,
even if we have not yet developed any means of
avoiding it. Thus, circumstances where there
are severe consequences from failing to detect
even a rare hazard provide the strongest ratio-
nale for invoking a substantial degree of pre-
caution. Presumably, this is why the most
widely cited version of the precautionary prin-
ciple has stressed its application for those situa-
tions where serious or irreversible consequences
are likely to arise unless precautionary action is
taken (United Nations 1992).
These valid concerns about precaution may
be better perceived by considering the chance
of a false-negative error occurring when we get
a negative screening result (1 – NPV). That
chance is illustrated in Figure 4 as a function of
P[H]. As with the inﬂuence of P[H] on PPV,
Figure 4 shows, as we should expect, that the
chance of a false-negative error declines in
direct proportion to P[H], becoming a very
small chance for very rare hazards, essentially
equal to β × P[H], because the possibility of a
false-negative error cannot exceed the chance
of the hazard. Applying this analysis to the pre-
vious airport screening example (β = 0.5%),
the chance of missing a passenger with a
weapon would be 1 out of 2 million negative
results when 1 in 10,000 passengers is carrying
a weapon (i.e., 0.5% of P[H]).
Issues surrounding precaution can be elab-
orated by considering a public health analogy
using two drinking-water incidents. The
Sydney, Australia, water crisis in 1998 has been
described as a case of issuing an advisory for
Sydney residents to boil water on the basis of
erroneous monitoring results (Clancy 2000),
what amounts to a false-positive (type I) error.
Increased surveillance and targeted telephone
surveys revealed no consistent evidence of any
increase in diarrheal disease, nor any increase in
laboratory-diagnosed cases of cryptosporidiosis,
despite the apparent detection of massive
numbers of Cryptosporidium oocysts in the
treated water supplied to 3 million consumers
(McClellan 1998). Recently, almost 5 years
after the episode, a rebuttal has been published
arguing that water contamination did occur
(Cox et al. 2003). However, all parties agree
that excess illness was absent in the commu-
nity, and because there are some serious incon-
sistencies in the case for these latest claims, we
accept Clancy’s account (Clancy 2000).
Walkerton, on the other hand, was a case of
false-negative (type II) error. Warnings were
ignored for more than 20 years and tragedy
resulted. Given this comparison, precaution in
public health demands that we should prefer
type I (false positive) over type II (false nega-
tive) errors because the consequences of the lat-
ter are usually more direct and potentially more
severe. However, we also need to recognize that
there are usually consequences to type I errors
as well (i.e., the ripples). In the Sydney case,
several million dollars of public funds were
spent on circumstances where public health
was apparently not endangered. Frequent type
I errors will create a “cry wolf” response with
the public such that important measures such
as advisories to boil water may be ignored
when they are truly needed.
A precautionary approach for public
health appears to be opposite to the conven-
tional scientiﬁc bias in hypothesis testing that
critics have claimed favors type II over type I
errors (Cranor 1993; M’Gonigle et al. 1994).
However, contrary to those criticisms that do
apply when either outcome is equally likely,
for situations where P[H] is < 0.33 (i.e., most
environmental health cases), accepting the
conventional scientiﬁc levels for α (5%) and
β (20%) does not create any probability bias
favoring detection of false positives compared
with false negatives. For P[H] = 0.33, 11% of
positives will be false and 10% of negatives
will be false. For progressively lower P[H], the
likelihood of detecting false positives increases
while that of detecting false negatives
decreases, so that we move toward a caution-
ary bias in probability criteria for less frequent
hazards regardless of what values we may
choose for α in relation to β.
We agree that the potentially greater sever-
ity of public health problems caused by false
negatives, as compared with false positives,
suggests that we should strive to avoid the for-
mer more than the latter. For hazards with
severe consequences, we will want to focus on
the chances of a false negative occurring (i.e.,
1–NPV; Figure 4). Regardless, it is clear that
our conventional risk management framework
becomes progressively and inherently more
cautious by generating many more false posi-
tives than false negatives as it is applied to
rarer hazards. This reality places a premium on
judgment for interpreting the evidence in
these cases, a need that demands the fullest
possible understanding of these relationships
that govern the nature of evidence.
Where the precautionary principle may be
most relevant is for a problem that is so
poorly understood that there is no prospect
for conﬁdently assessing it within this hazard-
screening framework. In such cases where
there is overriding conceptual or epistemic
uncertainty (Walker 1991), the greatest dan-
ger may be the chance of a type III error
(Kendall 1957). This error can be described
as misunderstanding a problem so completely
that we may find the right answer to the
wrong problem. A type III error is likely for
an event that has never happened before.
Returning to our airport security example,
a type III error arises if the primary hazard we
seek to detect comes from passengers carrying
plastic explosives that are undetectable by our
screening technology designed for metallic
weapons. In these uncertain circumstances, if
the stakes are sufﬁciently high for inaction, the
precautionary principle may provide appropri-
ate guidance toward taking some additional
action. In such cases, there must be an obliga-
tion to link the application of the precaution-
ary principle to a commitment for research to
better define and understand the problem
(Goldstein 1999): If a hazard is important
enough to invoke precaution as a justiﬁcation
for priority action, it must also be important
enough to understand better. 
Overall, to better define any hazard-
screening program, we should seek enough
understanding to allow us to estimate the
false-positive rate (α), the false-negative rate
(β), and the likely frequency of the hazard
(P[H]). This conclusion may appear to be cir-
cular in that the likelihood of the hazard must
be estimated before analyzing how precau-
tionary we are likely to be. This is more useful
than it may appear at ﬁrst glance. The need to
estimate hazard frequency in order to initiate
this analysis simply illustrates the inescapable
requirement for following an iterative
approach to evaluate complex problems, rein-
forces the importance of requiring evidence
from more than one source, and supports the
merits of Bayesian logic as a means to make
rational use of available evidence (Gill 2002). 
Serious problems, involving high stakes,
demand sequential analyses to acquire better
evidence often within the constraints of the
need for rapid answers. Just as surgeons do not
pursue high-risk surgery in search of a brain
tumor based only on initial screening evidence,
we will expect to gather improved sequential
evidence when high-stakes outcomes are sug-
gested by initial positive results. Likewise, par-
allel evidence consistent with hazardous
conditions will support an expectation of
higher P[H] than we would expect in the
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Figure 4. Quantitative dominance of the chance of
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risk groups for screening programs provides an
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to improve PPV.
Caution versus Futility
Finally, we may use all of the above reasoning
to turn the problem of precaution on its head,
so to speak. What we have sought to show (by
calling attention to the dominance of the fre-
quency of hazard over inherent error rates for
low-frequency hazards) is that our conven-
tional practices of risk management will
encounter a dominance of false positives, even
when they rely on valid screening evidence in
the case of searching for rare hazards. This
outcome is inevitable because the screening
method (even with a low false-positive rate)
must be applied to an overwhelming propor-
tion of nonhazards in search of a rare hazard.
The result may be appropriate in many cases,
if follow-up actions to positives detected are
measured and suited to the circumstances so
that the combined consequences of frequent
false positives do not exceed the consequences
of the rare hazard that we seek to avoid.
Poor risk management arises from an inad-
equate level of precaution, but, paradoxically,
seeking an excessively high and ultimately self-
defeating level of precaution for a narrowly
deﬁned rare hazard will also provide poor risk
management. This occurs because of the
diminishing returns achieved in pursuing the
illusion of “zero risk,” a pursuit that others have
critiqued for various related and differing rea-
sons (Cross 1996; Graham and Wiener 1995). 
As we pass the point of appropriate precau-
tion, motivated by a search to detect hazards at
lower and lower levels of likelihood, this “iron
law” of increasing false positives defeats us.
Below a certain low level of hazard frequency,
we simply cannot have a reliable idea of
whether what we fear is actually there or not,
unless we have resources and knowledge to pur-
sue a series of increasingly effective sequential
tests to provide meaningful evidence on
extremely small risks. For most environmental
health issues, our limited toolbox of valid
sequential tests will be rapidly depleted. Because
the interventions we devise (to combat diseases,
for example) have their own risks, the wisest
course of action is to avoid trying to be more
precautionary than our knowledge enables us to
be. In total, our analysis amounts to a mathe-
matical elaboration of the inevitability of risk
trade-offs and the compelling need for good
judgment to deal sensibly with those trade-offs.
Conclusions
As we have sought to show, our current best
practices for the management of risks from
well-characterized low-frequency hazards will
have an inevitable dominance of false posi-
tives over true positives and false negatives.
This implies an inherent degree of substantial
precaution, and thus practicing good risk
management cannot mean deciding whether
to be precautionary or not. Rather, the critical
question always is, how precautionary should
we be in any particular case? 
We know from experience that in many
cases (such as occupational exposure to asbestos
or sustaining the Atlantic cod ﬁshery) we have
been less precautionary than we ought to have
been. We hope that the contemporary empha-
sis on the precautionary principle may lessen
the chance of this occurring in the future. But
we have also sought to show that when we are
dealing with well-characterized hazards, we
sometimes unwittingly want to be more pre-
cautionary than it is possible to be, ensuring a
self-defeating outcome.
Certainly, if we allow false-positive errors
to reign without understanding what is hap-
pening, we risk fostering complacency to an
extent that we may ultimately be ensuring
eventual catastrophe through neglect. Risk
management needs to maintain a healthy ten-
sion based on considering the likelihood and
consequences of both false-positive and false-
negative errors, seeking an appropriate balance
between these opposite outcomes, rather than
zealously seeking the absolute elimination of
false-negative errors in a futile search for zero
risk. The increasingly serious and complex
challenges that we currently face on our planet
demand that we find better ways to make
more tangible, informed, and effective use of
our knowledge, not less. 
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